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Introduction 
From an American perspective, the central purpose of the "dissuasion strategy" spelled out in 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) and the key 
objective of the nuclear Non-Proliferation regime are identical: to reduce the likelihood that non-
nuclear weapons states, especially those with a history of hostility toward the United States and 
our allies, will acquire nuclear weapons. They are presented in The National Security Strategy of 
the United States of America as complementary tools in "our comprehensive strategy to combat 
WMD."[1] The means by which dissuasion strategy and the NPT regime are meant to influence 
the calculations and incentives of non-nuclear states, however, are quite different. Indeed, a 
review of the underlying logics and the methods by which these two tools are meant to work 
reveals severe tensions between the NPT regime and dissuasion strategy. 
This Strategic Insight highlights those contradictions in an effort to spark deeper thought about 
potential trade-offs between these two approaches, as well as ways in which tensions between 
them can be mitigated. Reasonable people can (and do) disagree about the current and potential 
effectiveness of dissuasion strategies and the NPT regime. But reasonable disagreements can 
best be resolved, or at least a more effective balance struck, if we clearly identify the underlying 
assumptions and tensions between these strategies designed to meet the same goals. 
The Logic of the NPT  
How do the NPT and the regime that surrounds it reduce the incentives and constrain the 
capabilities of non-nuclear states to build nuclear weapons? The NPT, I would argue, is built upon 
three related bargains. Unfortunately, each of these has been severely challenged, if not 
undercut, during the past decade: 
· The first bargain (and the most important one, in my view) is between the non-nuclear 
weapons states themselves. Many non-nuclear states would have a strong national 
security incentive to develop nuclear weapons if they feared that their neighbors were 
about to get them. The first bargain under the NPT is thus a solution to a collective action 
problem with the non-nuclear states telling each other, in effect, that "I won’t get nuclear 
weapons provided that you do not either"—and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
inspection system was designed to provide mutual assurances that each non-nuclear 
state was keeping its promises in that regard. Each time a new nuclear proliferant 
emerges in the international system, however, non-nuclear states in the region must 
reevaluate the attractiveness of this bargain: the Israeli nuclear weapons program, the 
development and testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in 1998, and most 
recently, the apparent development of nuclear weapons by the DPRK have, not 
surprisingly, led other states in their region to begin to reevaluate their nonproliferation 
policies.  
· The second bargain is enshrined in Article VI of the treaty—the promise that in exchange 
for nuclear restraint by the have-nots, the nuclear weapons states will "work in good faith" 
toward the eventual elimination of their own nuclear arsenals. In 1995, when negotiating 
for a permanent extension of the treaty, the United States government made a 
commitment that it would sign and ratify the CTBT as a signal of its Article VI 
commitment.[2] In addition, as part of this bargain, the U.S. and other nuclear states 
declared that they would not threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
weapons states who are members in good standing of the NPT.[3] This bargain has also 
been called into question: first, by the failure to the Senate to ratify the CTBT and then 
the decision of the Bush Administration to reject the treaty outright; and second, by the 
push within the Bush Administration to use nuclear weapons threats to deter chemical 
and biological threats. As noted below, the renewed emphasis on dissuasion in the The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America and other Bush Administration 
strategy documents have been cited as a third piece of evidence that the U.S. 
government, despite rhetoric to the contrary, has in fact abandoned its commitment to 
Article VI and related promises to the non-nuclear weapons states.  
· The third bargain is the promise under Article IV that the nuclear weapons states will 
permit non-nuclear weapons states to acquire and utilize nuclear technology for peaceful 
energy purposes. The compelling evidence that North Korea used NPT sanctioned 
nuclear facilities to develop nuclear weapons has highlighted the dangerous loophole in 
the NPT whereby states could cheat and then withdraw from the treaty, or withdraw from 
the treaty legally and use the materials and know-how to build a nuclear weapon. The 
Article IV bargain has thus unraveled as well, and both President Bush and IAEA director 
Mohammed El Baradei have presented proposals to eliminate the loophole by restricting 
access to full fuel cycle technology and revising or eliminating the NPT 90-day withdrawal 
clause.  
In short, the NPT regime reduces the incentives of non-nuclear states to get nuclear weapons by 
embedding their decisions in a web of bargains. Obviously, not all signatories to the treaty have 
been successfully constrained: witness North Korea, Iraq (before the 1991 Gulf War), and Iran 
today. But others have been significantly constrained, and if current challenges to the NPT 
regime are not dealt with effectively in the near future, a significant number of non-nuclear states 
that have the capability to develop nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time 
(approximately two-three years) will be forced to reconsider the costs and benefits of remaining in 
the treaty. [See Table 1.]  
The Logic of Dissuasion Strategies  
The logic of the dissuasion strategy is different from that of the NPT. As outlined in various Bush 
Administration strategy documents, the logic of dissuasion is that foreign governments will be 
constrained from developing advanced weapons capabilities by their belief that U.S. offensive 
and defensive military capabilities are so strong that their quest for such capabilities would at best 
be too expensive at best,and at worst be futile. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld elevated dissuasion to a U.S. defense policy on par with 
deterrence and defense in the September 2001 Quadrennial Review, calling for "a portfolio of 
U.S. military capabilities, capabilities that could not only help us prevail against current threats, 
but because we possess them, hopefully dissuade potential adversaries from developing 
dangerous new capabilities themselves."[4] In September 2002, the White House linked 
dissuasion to effective defense and consequence management in The National Security Strategy 
of the United States: "Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those 
who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading 
enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends."[5] That policy document also explained how 
U.S. military superiority would be pursued, for under the logic of dissuasion '[o]ur forces will be 
strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of 
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."[6] Finally, the December 2002 
document, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction appeared to expand the 
declaratory policy of "calculated ambiguity", which had previously used ambiguous nuclear 
threats to deter chemical or biological weapons use, as part of the dissuasion strategy to reduce 
the risks of WMD acquisition: "A strong declaratory policy and effective military forces are 
essential elements of our contemporary deterrent posture, along with the full range of political 
tools to persuade potential adversaries not to seek  or use WMD. The United States will continue 
to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—including through 
resort to all of our options—to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and 
our friends and allies."[7] 
Conflicts and Conundrums  
There are serious conflicts between these two strategies with regard to nuclear non-proliferation. 
First, dissuasion strategy implies that the United States must maintain a significant degree of 
superiority in numbers of nuclear forces over other states to reduce their ability and hence 
incentives to catch up to the United States (relevant to all other nuclear states, except possibly for 
Russia), or to reduce the capability and incentives of non-nuclear states to acquire weapons. This 
policy implication of dissuasion strategy, however logical, clearly conflicts with the Article VI 
commitment to work in good faith toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. 
While a number of current and former government officials have claimed that global perceptions 
that the U.S. is keeping that commitment are not an important factor in foreign governments’ 
decisions to develop or not develop nuclear weapons,[8] the cases they cite are always the most 
difficult ones: states that have little domestic debate and seem determined to get weapons of 
mass destruction, such as North Korea and Iraq. In a wider set of non-nuclear weapons "fence 
sitter" states, especially those in which domestic political actors may hold contrasting positions 
about getting nuclear weapons, the belief that that the U.S. government has abandoned Article VI 
commitments had increased.[9] It is impossible to predict precisely how such beliefs will influence 
future debates by such potential proliferators as Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt. But 
it is easy to predict that perceptions that the U.S. is not keeping up its side of the NPT bargain will 
make it easier for hawks in those countries to argue for abandoning their governments NPT 
commitments. Even the Iranian government’s decisions about nuclear weapons procurement is 
likely to be increasingly influenced by domestic political debates in the coming years, and 
perceptions of U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations (while perhaps less crucial than U.S. 
coercive diplomacy) may have a significant impact on the substance and outcome of such 
debates.[10] 
Second, the argument that even limited ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities will dissuade 
current countries of concern from developing WMD is highly suspect in my view. Not only are 
there serious questions about the technical military capabilities of current BMD, especially against 
a government that utilizes simple countermeasures such as decoys and chaff to spoof defense 
target acquisition capabilities, but there are other means of delivery available—both covert means 
and alternative military delivery systems against U.S. forces and allies—to potential and current 
proliferators such as Iran and North Korea. This argument does not necessary imply the U.S. 
should never deploy BMD to counter such WMD threats. But it does mean we should be skeptical 
of arguments that suggest defenses will dissuade non-nuclear states that are hostile to us from 
developing WMD that they believe will level the playing field to a significant degree. 
Indeed, it is worth noting here that some of the discussions of dissuasion strategies have a logical 
contradiction in them: "rogue" states are sometimes described as being so irrational as not to be 
subject to deterrence, but somehow rational enough to be subject to the more subtle influences of 
dissuasion. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, for example, claims 
that "rogue states" are "more willing to take risks" than were Cold War enemies and are 
"determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction." Yet these same governments, it is argued, 
may be subject to dissuasion.[11] 
Third, and finally, there is no evidence I know of that demonstrates that U.S. threats to use 
nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological weapons use by enemies has successfully 
deterred enemy states in crises or conflicts, much less successfully dissuaded hostile 
governments not to acquire chemical or biological weapons. There are strong reasons to prefer a 
U.S. strategic doctrine that emphasizes the threat of overwhelming conventional military 
responses against any state that uses chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies.[12] 
If nuclear states, especially the United States, are seen to need nuclear weapons to deter 
chemical and biological attacks from regional powers, won’t other regional actors feel increased 
incentives to get nuclear weapons themselves? Even more important, in my view, is the danger of 
a nuclear "commitment trap" in which a U.S. President’s deterrent threats to use nuclear weapons 
fails, and he feels compelled to follow through on that threat following a BW or CW attack for the 
sake of maintaining his personal credibility and U.S. global credibility. 
Conclusion  
In planning for future U.S. military forces and capabilities, "dissuasion" has always been one of 
the background goals. Placing it at the forefront in recent planning documents and declaratory 
policies has the benefit of forcing defense planners and analysts to think more thoroughly about 
how to persuade other governments not to seek capabilities we hope to avoid facing in the future. 
The U.S. government should be more careful, however, not to make statements or present 
strategic arguments, for the sake of dissuasion, that undermine the remaining important—though 
fragile—strengths of the NPT regime. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic 
Insights home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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